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Abstract
Wireless sensor networks are becoming an important facilitator for the
Internet of Things. These embedded devices can harvest different types of
information such as temperature, pressure and humidity, which offer impor-
tant data for making decisions regarding various applications such as health-
care, logistics and smart homes. Different sensors working together act as
a local sensor network. With the advent of the new 6LowPan standard the
sensor nodes can even participate in Internet communications, opening up
even more possibilities. The downside is that these networks are more prone
to intrusion by unwanted parties. Furthermore implementing security is not
straightforward due to the constrained nature of the sensor nodes, although
different solutions have been proposed. One of the remaining and most chal-
lenging issues is the key management problem. In this paper, we propose
a symmetric key management scheme for wireless sensor networks that uses
tamper-proof hardware for key generation and distribution. The scheme re-
quires no deployment knowledge before enrolling and makes use of a trusted
central entity for key negotiation to provide end-to-end security. Our imple-
mentation and evaluation were performed on the tiny Zolertia Z1 hardware
platform, running Contiki-OS. The performance and security evaluation show
that our scheme requires a limited amount of storage and provides a good
network resilience against node capture.
Keywords: 6LowPan, Wireless Sensor Network Security, Symmetric Key Man-
agement, Link-Layer Security, End-to-End Security
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1. Introduction
The recently released 6LowPan standard allows for a tight integration between the
Internet and wireless sensor networks (WSNs) [2]. Sensor nodes using 6LowPan
can directly communicate with IPv6 hosts which enables the use of standard servers
for sensor data processing. This considerably increases the flexibility of wireless
sensors and reduces the need for complex gateways. On the other hand, granting
Internet connectivity introduces additional security implications. Aside from the
known attacks against WSNs, these sensor networks now have to deal with security
problems of traditional IP networks [1]. Furthermore, the constrained nature of
the wireless devices limits the use of complex security mechanisms. Nevertheless
security is generally required in WSNs. For instance, in a home automation ap-
plication, where adversaries can use the temperature measurements to deduct the
absence of inhabitants. In such a setting, encryption would be desirable to ensure
data confidentiality 1.
Nowadays, wireless sensor nodes with network connectivity generally run an
operating system (OS) to provide multiple application support. One of these OSs
is Contiki [3], which is an open source, C-based, multitasking OS for memory-
efficient networked embedded systems and WSNs. It uses the µIPv6-stack for
6LowPan communications and is growing in popularity. Contiki, however, does
not provide built-in support for security key management.
In this paper we present our open source Contiki implementation of a symmetric
key management scheme suited for a variety of sensor nodes. The scheme offers
network-wide integrity 2, confidentiality and end-to-end security as well as semantic
security 3. It relies on a basic infrastructure for key distribution and makes use of
tamper-proof hardware for key generation. The implementation and evaluation are
performed on the Zolertia Z1 hardware platform, running Contiki-OS [4]. In our
design we tried to take full advantage of the available hardware security primitives
from the CC2420 transceiver by Chipcon [5]. Being able to use a hardware AES128
co-processor [6] for security operations, releases more time and resources for a
robust implementation of the key management scheme. This is reflected in an
improved resilience against denial-of-service (DoS) attacks.
The outline of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we review
the related work in WSNs. In Sect. 3 we present the proposed key management
architecture. The implementation of the scheme within Contiki is described in
Sect. 4. In Sect.5 we evaluate and analyze the performance of our implementation.
After the evaluation, we conclude the paper in Sect. 6.
1Confidentiality: prevents an attacker from reading what is being transmitted over the com-
munication channel.
2Integrity: guarantees that the message has not been modified during the transmission.
3Semantic security: knowledge of the ciphertext (and length) of some unknown message does
not reveal any additional information on the message that can be feasibly extracted
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2. Related work
Consulting the literature on implementations of symmetric key management ar-
chitectures shows that SPINS is one of the first security architectures designed for
WSNs [7]. It uses two secure building blocks called SNEP and µTesla to provide
data confidentiality, authentication, integrity and freshness. We used this work as
a starting point for our design, due to the low resource requirements and good
scaling factors. Unfortunately, SNEP was never fully specified.
Yüksel et al. present the Zigbee symmetric key management scheme for low
power WSNs [8]. The scheme provides network security and end-to-end security, by
using three different types of keys: a master key, a network key and a link key. They
specify the symmetric-key key establishment (SKKE) protocol for key negotiation
and the mutual entity authentication (MEA) protocol for authentication. We used
architectural design choices of this work in our design.
In 2009, ContikiSec [9] was presented as a secure network layer for WSNs,
integrated in the Contiki-OS. They provide three security modes: confidentiality,
authentication and integrity. In addition, they offer a thorough measuring method-
ology that we used during our evaluation.
The contribution of our work is providing an open source implementation of
a symmetric key management scheme suited for constraint WSNs running the
Contiki-OS.
3. Proposed key management architecture
In this section, we present our symmetric key management scheme specifically
designed for low-power IP-enabled WSNs. After analyzing the possible attacks
against WSNs [1], we chose for a distributive scheme that uses parts of the SPINS
protocol [7] and the Zigbee 2007 security scheme [8]. We start by defining the
general topology of the network in Sect. 3.1. Followed by the various phases of the
scheme in Sect. 3.2 and, finally, the security properties in Sect. 3.3.
3.1. The key management topology
The key management scheme infrastructure can be divided into four major parts.
The first part consists out of a Tablet and portable PUF 4. They are used during the
initial phases of the scheme for key generation and distribution. The second part
is the trusted central entity (TCE), which serves as the main dissemination com-
ponent for cryptographic material in the network. The third part is the 6LowPan
edge-router (ER) that acts as the seamless interconnection between the central
entity and the WSN. Finally, we have the individual sensor nodes. The above
mentioned parts are illustrated in Figure 1. All of them play a particular role
4PUF: a Physical Unclonable Function is a physical entity that is embodied in a physical
structure and is easy to evaluate but hard to predict.
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throughout the different phases of the scheme, by making use of three types of
keys: the network key (Kn), sensor key (Ks) and session key (Kss).
Figure 1: Topology of the key management scheme
3.2. Key management scheme phases
Our scheme consists of three phases: the bootstrapping, the discovery and the
pairing phase.
Bootstrapping phase
The bootstrapping phase describes how the network is initialized and installed. We
start by setting-up the database of the TCE. The PUF in combination with the
tablet, generates a list of cryptographic strong keys for use inside the entire network.
The list of keys is then transferred to the TCE through a secure connection and
stored in the database. Once the central entity has enough security material it
is possible to connect the 6LowPan ERs. Each ER sends a network-key request
over an encrypted tunnel completing the initialization of the basic key management
infrastructure.
After the basic infrastructure is initialized, we can start adding sensor nodes
to the 6LowPan networks. A new sensor node has no knowledge of the designated
network and therefore has no associated cryptographic key material for that net-
work. In order to add a new node we need to bootstrap the right key material.
This is done by using a wired interface that connects the node to the TCE as shown
in Figure 2. The node sends a hello-packet over a serial SLIP connection to the
installer laptop, which on its turn forwards the packet over the encrypted tunnel
to the central entity. The information from the node is stored in the database and
awaits approval from the user. Once the user has authorized the node through
a tablet interface, the TCE will transfer the selected key material back over the
same connection. Each node receives a unique Ks and a Kn that is shared by
the assigned 6LowPan network. The Ks is used for Kss establishment and will be
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discussed later on.
Figure 2: Wired bootstrapping of new sensor nodes
Discovery phase
During the discovery phase the sensor nodes try to establish their routes by means
of a routing protocol. The shared Kn is used to secure and authenticate the com-
munications to and from each node. The entities and adversaries that have no
knowledge of the Kn are unable to participate in network communications. This
is a basic security feature of the IEEE 802.15.4 standard [10] and increases the
robustness of the network.
Pairing phase
The pairing phase describes how two entities can establish a Kss by using a variant
of the SNEP protocol [7] based on the NeedhamSchroeder symmetric protocol [11].
Suppose that a node 'x' wants to establish a Kss with node 'y' through a trusted
third party, which in our case is the trusted central entity (TCE). The TCE plays
a role as key distribution center and shares an individual Ks with each node in the
network. Node x will initiate the communication by sending a request message to
node y. Node y receives the request and replies with a challenge. This challenge, in
combination with additional data from node x, is transferred to the TCE by node
x. The TCE will perform the authentication and select the Kss. Afterwards it will
send the Kss back to nodes x and y, encrypted with their individual Ks. In order
to verify if the key transfer was successful, node x demands a verification message
from node y. If the message is correct, the protocol is completed successfully. Once
the pairing phase is finished, the nodes can start using their shared Kss for secure
end-to-end communications.
3.3. Security properties
The key-management scheme properties are listed in Table 1. We give an overview
of the advantages and security trade-offs that exist in our scheme.
The security mechanisms of our scheme operate at two different levels of the
µIP-stack: the link layer and application layer. In the former, the shared Kn is
used by the AES core in CBC-MAC mode to provide message integrity. In the
latter, the Kss achieves end-to-end security by using the AES-core in CCM mode,
providing data confidentiality, authentication and semantic security [12].
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Advantages Security trade-offs
- Optimal use of hardware security
primitives.
- Adding nodes forms threat due to
unencrypted serial SLIP interface.
- Nodes have limited responsibilities. - Manual malicious node detection.
- Storage of few keys in each node. - Adding nodes is slow.
- Compromising a node forms no threat
for end-to-end security.
- Compromised Kn breaks link layer
security.
- No pre-shared keys required between
nodes.
- Central entity is single point of
trust.
- Excluding compromised nodes is triv-
ial.
- Central entity contains all crypto-
graphic material.
- Good scaling factors due to limited
storage of keys.
- Relies on basic infrastructure for
key management.
Table 1: Overview of the security properties of the proposed scheme
4. Implementation in Contiki
The key-management scheme is implemented as a separate process within the multi-
threaded environment of Contiki. It operates completely autonomous from other
layers within the stack allowing transparency for the application. Figure 3 displays
the current µIP-stack involvement of the scheme. The core functionality is situated
in a layer on top of the transport layer, while the wired bootstrapping mechanism
is done separately. We start by discussing the bootstrapping protocol, followed by
a detailed description of our key-management implementation.
Figure 3: µIP-stack overview
The wired bootstrapping protocol uses the existing SLIP component within
Contiki to save memory resources. The component has been modified to solely fit
the requirements of the protocol. The program starts by checking the content of
the external flash memory for cryptographic key material. We used the external
memory to store the Kn, Ks and nonce data as well as the TCE address to prevent
the loss of bootstrap material in case of a power failure or reset. If there are no
keys detected, the SLIP component is initialized and the hello-packet, containing
the node information, is transmitted once. As mentioned in the previous section,
the packet is then forwarded and awaits approval from the user. After permission,
the TCE formulates a reply message that consist of the Ks, Kn and TCE-address
and the message is sent back. The running SLIP process handles the reply message
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and stores the security data in the node's external flash memory. The final step
is performing a software reset to load the new security material and finalize the
bootstrap protocol. This time the SLIP component is not initialized since there
is valid security material. The advantages of disabling the SLIP component after
bootstrapping are: we deny adversaries to use the serial interface after deployment
and we free-up processing power.
The key-management layer is implemented as a separate process that contains
two event-handlers running in parallel. The first is a polling handler using the
event-timer library of Contiki. The second is a udp-event handler that gets trig-
gered when receiving a packet on the key management udp-connection. Both events
make use of security material that is arranged in slots described in Table 2. The
slots contain the following information about the sessions: nonce data, Kss, remote
ipv6 address, time of last activity and a status byte. The first two slots are reserved
for communications with TCE. The third slot, Slot 2, is reserved for temporary key
exchange data and is only used during key exchange. The remaining session slots
are used for storage of end-to-end security data and can be expanded at compile
time. Notice that increasing the slot size has a negative impact on memory.
Slot 0 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 3 Slot 4 Slot 5
TCE Ks TCE Kss RESV Session 0 Session 1 Session 2
Table 2: Key management security material slots
The main key management program involves a state machine that gets ma-
nipulated by the events, shown in Figure 4. During the IDLE state, the polling
event periodically checks the status of the slots for changes regarding nonce up-
dates and key requests. If a session in one of the slots is expired the state will be
changed to key request, invoking the key exchange protocol. The udp-events can
also change the state to key request if a valid request message is received. The
expired/requested session data is copied to the RESV slot and the protocol is ini-
tialized. Since there is only one RESV slot available, there can only be one key
exchange at a time.
Figure 4: Main state machine (left) and Key state machine (right)
The used exchange protocol, described in the previous section, is also imple-
mented as a state machine that is illustrated in Figure 4. Depending on the action,
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expired or requested, a different path is chosen by the key state machine. Each
key-state remains locked until a new valid message is received or a time-out occurs.
This prevents unwanted behavior in case of replay packets or broken communica-
tion links. During the lock, protocol messages are retransmitted until the maximum
retransmission count is exceeded or the lock is released. After the time-out, the
protocol is aborted and the session request is marked as failed. The failed sessions
are put in a queue to allow other requests. Eventually, after repeated failure of
a queued request, the failed session is assigned a time-out that increases with the
amount of failures. If, on the other hand, the protocol is concluded successfully, the
RESV data is copied to the requesting slot or a free session slot. By using the lock
on states and the time-out on session failures, we increase the resilience against
DoS attacks. Consider, for example, continuous interference of adversaries on the
channel preventing the protocol from finishing successfully. Our implementation
prevents the exhaustion of battery power due to the increased time-out on each
failure.
The encryption and decryption functions also reside in the key management
layer. The application uses these functions to perform the end-to-end security op-
erations and request new sessions. In contrast to predetermining a list of commu-
nication sessions, we decided to implement an on-demand architecture allowing the
application to dynamically choose its sessions at runtime. The encryption function
is partially responsible for handling this functionality. Each time the application
wants to send an encrypted message to a new destination, the function searches
the slots for a free spot or makes room for one by removing the least active session.
The new session is marked as expired and in turn the polling mechanism captures
the session request. Another way of overwriting a session slot is by successfully
concluding a remote key request. If the requesting node is unknown and the slots
are full, the least active device is overwritten with RESV data. The advantage of
this method is the flexibility without the need for large memory requirements and
the increased resilience against node capture. Consider, for example, a configura-
tion where we have three session slots available. Even if there are ten compromised
nodes in the network, all willing to establish a Kss with us, the application is
still able to communicate with the desired entities by overwriting the compromised
slots. The disadvantage, however, is the time and energy cost that is bound to the
continues reestablishment of a new Kss due to session slot overflow.
The link-layer security and CC2420 AES-CCM drivers are implemented in the
lower layers of the µIP-stack. We only had to change small settings in the radio
driver to enable link-layer security. The AES-drivers ensure that all the block
cipher modes are performed in hardware by the AES co-processor of the CC2420.
5. Evaluation and results
Resource management is one of the most important aspects of WSNs. Therefore, we
measured the impact of encryption/decryption speed, energy consumption as well
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as memory usage of our implementation, by using the same measuring methodology
as described in ContikiSec [9]. We start by listing the encryption/decryption speeds
together with the energy consumption, shown in Table 3.
Speed (ms) energy (µJ)
AES-CCM driver Enc. 1.30 ±0.01 115
AES-CCM driver Decr. 1.44 ±0.01 124
End-to-end AES-CCM Enc. 1.71 ±0.01 120
End-to-end AES-CCM Decr. 1.55 ±0.01 126
Table 3: Speed and energy results for the security operations
The results of the security operations are measured for a message containing
50 bytes of associated data, 69 bytes of encrypted payload and 8 bytes for the
message integrity code. We took the average of 100 speed measurements to formu-
late our results. Looking at the datasheet of the CC2420 transceiver, we see that
the AES-CCM encryption itself takes 222 µs. This translates in 1.08 ms overhead
caused by the driver for copying data and setting registers of the transceiver. If
we add key-management overhead, we lose 1.49 ms for encryption and 1.33 ms for
decryption.
The memory requirements of the scheme and security mechanisms are described
in Table 4. We used the 20-bit addressing capabilities of the MSP430F2617 [13] to
enable the full 92kB of program memory.
Contiki
(no 20-bit)
Contiki
(with 20-bit)
AES-CCM
driver
Link-layer
security
Full impl.
ROM (B) 48927 58099 986 2202 7282
RAM (B) 5778 6762 / 446 557
Table 4: Memory requirements of the implementation
The utilization of 20-bit addressing is translated in an increase of almost 19%
in memory. This results in a total size 58 kB for the Contiki-OS without security.
The AES-CCM driver accounts for 986 bytes of the full key management imple-
mentation. The Link-layer security and wired bootstrapping takes 2.2 kB of the
program memory. Finally, the full program size of our symmetric key management
implementation is 7282 bytes of ROM and 557 bytes of RAM. In total, our scheme
costs 8% of the available memory space of our platform.
6. Conclusion
We presented a robust implementation of our symmetric key management scheme,
which provides link-layer security and end-to-end security for WSNs. The scheme
has been integrated in the µIP-stack of the Contiki operating system. Our design
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tries to achieve low energy consumption combined with a high resilience against
DoS attacks. Our evaluation was performed on the Zolertia Z1 platform, a general
purpose development platform created by Zolertia. In the future we will try to
extend the scheme with key-updates and examine the possibility of secure wireless
bootstrapping for the sensor nodes.
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